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Abstract
A major disaster occurred in a major city in the USA. The aftermath
produced significant difficulties in patient care. Failure of the
communication system, lack of command and control, and
incomplete planning were at the root of all of these difficulties.
Introduction
Despite what the Federal Government would have you
believe, disasters in the USA (and most of the rest of the
world) will probably not result from biochemical terrorism or
weapons of mass destruction. Such events could happen,
but over the past 20 years, including the period since 9/11,
disasters have resulted primarily from natural causes, blasts,
or structural collapse. Because such disasters are the most
common, it is for these that we must prepare. Biochemical
terrorism and use of weapons of mass destruction are
possible, but the same principles of patient care apply to
these events and the more common disasters, but with some
variations. Principles vs preferences The principles apply to
all. The preferences will vary according to etiology. The ole
medical school axiom still applies – when you hear hoof
beats, expect horses not zebras.
Most physicians in the USA are not informed about disaster
management, have only a very superficial knowledge of the
preparations made by their individual hospitals or within their
community, and have not participated in local disaster drills.
There are several reasons for such lack of knowledge: ‘it has
never happened here, so I won’t waste my time learning
about it’; ‘the nurses and administrators do all the planning
and don’t include me’; and ‘the drills are all about uncommon
events involving things like biochemicals; these events are
unlikely to happen so why should I play their silly games?’
When a disaster does occur, the physicians are mentally
unprepared for the constraints imposed by the situation and
do not understand the new paradigm for patient care. With
such a lack of knowledge, they become part of the problem
rather than part of the solution because they refuse to follow
the game plan, dropping out completely or trying to impose
their own ideas that are not consistent with the disaster
management strategy. A confounding factor is that the drills
are seldom, if ever, practiced in real time to acquire knowledge
of the peculiarities that result from local conditions.
The response to disasters can be divided into three phases:
immediate (local), external assistance, and backfill (resupply).
Patient care will be driven by the availability of people,
supplies, and equipment within these three phases (Table 1).
Furthermore, there are two types of disasters, with significant
differences in planning requirements, management, and
outcome, namely those with and those without infrastructure
failure. Katrina demonstrated both of these types. In New
Orleans the disaster produced infrastructure loss; the same
hurricane produced a disaster in Houston but the
infrastructure remained intact.
Immediate
For the first 2–6 days after a disaster, the response and
medical care will come from local health care providers, using
supplies that are on hand, equipment that is not damaged by
the incident, and treating patients with illness and injuries
who fall into the following categories: those present within
the hospital prior to the incident; those with injuries that are
the immediate result of the incident; and those with pre-
existing conditions. The first group of patients to be
addressed is those who were in the hospital when the
situation occurred. Their care will be modified by loss of
power and restricted availability of food, water, and
medications. In Katrina, because of the isolation (the
hospitals became islands without access from or to the
outside) there was no replenishment of much needed
supplies, including diesel fuel for the backup electrical
generators.
Preparation includes ensuring availability of everything that
will be required to care for patients; these supplies include
potable water, food and medical supplies (including
medication and oxygen), but also various other items that are
critical but do not necessarily pop to one’s immediate
consciousness. The latter might include a week’s supply of
diesel fuel and human waste disposal facilities (e.g. a red
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human waste bag placed over a toilet and a couple of scoops
of kitty litter significantly reduce the contamination and odor
that occur when toilets fail because of loss of water pressure
and sewerage overflow). When these items are in storage
they must be inspected periodically to replace expired items,
and security services must be available to protect against
pilferage by two-, four-, and six-legged creatures.
As has been discussed following every disaster in the USA
(and Katrina was no exception), communication failed. Cell
phones worked sometimes but there were too many people
trying to make calls, too many towers had been blown down,
and without power the batteries could not be recharged.
Satellite phones did not work in the buildings and only about
50% of the time while standing in the parking lot. Handheld
push-to-talk phones and radios need access to repeater
towers and also need to be recharged. Power outage also
has an impact on hospital phone networks; paging, and
internal and external phone calls are lost.
The only phones that remained functional after Katrina were
the old-fashioned, non-battery-powered direct lines to Bell
South. These phones were on local lines, and calls out of the
city for help had to be charged to a credit card. Phones that
went through the hospital network and trunk lines failed when
the power was lost. Information exchange within the hospital
was by runners.
Communication between Charity Hospital, University
Hospitals, and Tulane University Medical Center was via
messengers wading through contaminated water or paddling
canoes, via notes carried by boat drivers, or on occasion via
bullhorn to bullhorn from the roof of the hospital. No direct
voice-to-voice or other real-time communication worked.
Such poor information exchange produced lack of
understanding, confusion, misinterpretation, and out of
context appraisal. All of this led to poor exchange of
information between individuals, hard feelings, lack of
coordinated patient movement, and on occasion poor or
delayed patient care.
As a result of the communication breakdown, there was no
city-wide command and control. Every island was left to
function on their own, setting their own rules and planning
their own evacuation, security, and resupply.
Evacuation of patients, health care workers, families, and
refugees was done by boat, large military trucks or
helicopters. Boats worked for a while until one of them was
‘boat-jacked’ and the driver shot. The downside of the boats
was that they carried people to the freeway, where queues
for the buses were long and minimal patient care was
available, and no medical care was provided en route. There
were similar downsides to the use of trucks. The only viable
transportation for patients was via helicopter to another
medical center or to an airport with ground medical
transportation. With all of the local hospitals effected by
Katrina, the transportation time and therefore return to pick
up other patients was 1–2 hours. To evacuate patients from
hospitals in a timely manner, many helicopters were needed.
For the entire evacuation process 250 landings and takeoffs
occurred.
For a helipad, light poles were pulled from the top of the
parking lot adjacent to the hospital to provide a landing zone.
The initial design of the parking lot had accounted for the
stress exerted by a heavy helicopter. Both Blackhawk and
Chinook helicopters landed without difficulty. To control for
potential overload of the landing zone due to weight of the
larger helicopters and to make use of aircraft as efficient as
possible, all patients, health care workers, and other
personnel were loaded ‘hot’ (no engine shutdown and with
rotors turning).
There are additional unexpected patients and other personnel
who arrive at a medical facility and must be cared for and
evacuated. This must be taken into consideration in
developing plans for disaster management. For example, at
the time when Katrina hit, there were 110 patients, 800
medical personnel, and about 200 other personnel at Tulane
University Medical Center. At the completion of the
evacuation process, 254 patients and 1400 medical
personnel, family members, and others had been evacuated
(i.e. 1110 patients and others versus 1654 evacuees).
Table 1
Response phases
Phase Details
Immediate 2–5 days without help
Local resources only
Preparation:
Storage
Detail planning
Practice
Communication
Command and control
Patient care
Evacuation
Regional/national Access to disaster site
Physical limitations
Legal limitations
Political limitations
Communications
Local system
Access to outside
Command and control
Organization
Backfill People
Equipment
SuppliesPage 3 of 3
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Regional/national response
The regional/national response should be set up to achieve
several goals: to provide immediate assistance in the manage-
ment of patients; to provide or assist with evacuation; to
replenish supplies; and to provide rest for weary personnel on
a gradual replacement basis with overlap. With Katrina, in two
of the three hospitals there was difficulty in achieving any of
these goals. The author does not know the etiology of the
failure at the time of writing. It can only be speculated upon,
and therefore will not be addressed here. Tulane University
Medical Center was able to respond to requests for
assistance in the first three categories. The last category is not
applicable because the Center was completely evacuated.
Throughout the region, however, there were significant areas
of failure. National/regional assistance came late, was
blocked by local authorities that perhaps did not understand
the need, and was inadequate to meet the needs. Failure of
the communication system, lack of command and control,
and incomplete planning were at the root of these problems.
Backfill/resupply
Backfill (or resupply), as the term implies, requires additional
personnel to replace those who were on the frontline for the
first few days and have become tired and spent. Such
additional personnel include physicians, nursing and
maintenance personnel to staff the hospitals or new or
portable hospitals, and ambulance personnel and units to
relieve the emergency medical service staff who were initially
present.
In Mississippi, the inflow of backfill personnel from both
military and nonmilitary sources seemed to work smoothly.
Reports from volunteers who attempted to assist in Louisiana
suggest that backfill did not work as well there. The sources
of the constraints are difficult to identify.
The USNS Comfort arrived in New Orleans and sailed out in
under 2 weeks. This occurred at a time when the trauma
center and all of the major hospitals in the city of New
Orleans were disabled or were beyond reasonable repair and
condemned. Three hospitals in the neighboring parish
(Jefferson) were stretched to capacity and were at the point
of refusing patients (because of lack of nurses to open beds)
when the Comfort was ordered to sail. This left only a military
combat support hospital unit and two or three emergency
tent-type units. The mission of the combat support hospital is
to provide initial patient care and then transfer patients to a
full service hospital within 48 hours. Therefore, area hospitals
had to agree to accept transfer of these patients. In many
instances this was difficult because of lack of bed availability.
This highlights two major current and impending problems in
the system. First, the lack of nurses means that major
hospitals cannot open beds. Volunteer nurses have difficulty
in getting jobs in the hospitals (credentialing), and local
nurses working in the hospitals cannot find houses or
apartments to live in. Second, the large mobile hospital
(USNS Comfort) was ordered to leave as more patients were
being admitted. It did not stay to support the surge as
residents returned to the city and while major construction
was ongoing. At the time of scheduled departure of the
combat support hospitals from New Orleans (in 3–4 weeks
at the time of writing), no major hospitals will be fully
operational in the city.
Failure of the communication system, lack of command and
control, and incomplete planning is again at the root of these
problems.
Conclusion
The Katrina storm and resulting flood devastated the vital city
of New Orleans stands testimony to the inadequacy of multi-
level rescue and recovery systems. Failure of these systems
due to ineffective planning and lack of effective command
authority must be addressed in the future.
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